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Latmiya: Inside the Ashura rituals shaping Iran’s wartime narrative
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Latmiya: Inside the Ashura rituals shaping Iran’s wartime narrative Zahra Ladha on Wed, 05/06/2026 - 09:36 Mourning performances, Karbala symbolism and nationalist reinterpretations converge in Iran's messaging Ashura performances have become a feature of Iran's wartime atmosphere (Hossein Sotoodeh/Screen grab) Off In darkened halls across Iran, hundreds of men dressed in black beat their chests in unison as religious eulogists chant rhythmic laments of martyrdom, sacrifice and war. The performances, often lit in red and shared widely on YouTube and social media in Iran, have become a recurring feature of the country's wartime atmosphere since the 12-day Iran-Israel war in June 2025. Known as latmiyah, these mourning recitations are rooted in Ashura rituals commemorating the martyrdom of Shia Imam Hussain ibn Ali, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, at the Battle of Karbala in 680 CE. Since , prominent state-backed eulogists such as Mahdi Rasouli, Hossein Taheri, Seyed Reza Narimani and Hossein Sotoudeh have released new wartime recitations framing the US-Israel war on Iran through the symbolic language of Karbala. Some clips have drawn admiration from pro-government supporters online, while critics have condemned them as an attempt by the Islamic Republic to fuse religious mourning with political mobilisation. (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); Increasingly, these performances have also incorporated Persian nationalist motifs, presenting the conflict not only as a defence of Islam, but of Iran itself. That raises a broader question: what narratives now underpin Iran’s wartime ritual language, and who has the authority to define the symbols of Karbala, nationhood and resistance? Iran’s ritual infrastructure Millions of Iranians and Shia Muslims across the region mark Ashura each year through mourning rituals, poetry recitations and pilgrimage to Karbala, a city in central Iraq. In Shia memory, Hussain’s killing at Karbala after his refusal to pledge allegiance to the Caliph Yazid ibn Muawiyah became a defining story of resistance to unjust rule. This story of resistance later became deeply embedded in Iranian social life. (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); After the Safavid dynasty made Twelver Shia Islam Iran’s official religion in the 16th century, Ashura rituals became a central part of religious and communal life. The result was a ritual infrastructure that outlasted dynasties and political systems and has, at various points, shaped Iranian politics. During the Tobacco Protest of 1891-92, a nationwide movement against a foreign tobacco concession, preachers spread the anti-tobacco fatwa of Mirza Hasan Shirazi, a leading Shia cleric, through mosques and bazaars. Participants in the 1905-11 Constitutional Revolution also drew heavily on Ashura symbolism in their demonstrations and political rhetoric. Decades later, the protests that deposed Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1979 featured chants such as “Our movement is Hussaini, our leader is Khomeini”, drawing a direct parallel between revolutionary struggle and Hussain’s martyrdom. Across these moments, mourning rituals did more than preserve religious memory. They also created emotional and political authority through preachers, reciters and religious singers. The establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979 amplified this role. During the Iran-Iraq War that followed, Karbala became a central language of wartime mobilisation, helping lay the groundwork for the later prominence of turning religious singers, or maddahs, as intermediaries between the state and society. Ashura in wartime mobilisation This ritual infrastructure remains central to the Islamic Republic’s wartime mobilisation. Since June 2025, state-backed maddahs have framed both the Iran-Israel war and the current US-Israel war on Iran as extensions of Karbala, using mourning recitations to cast the conflicts as tests of sacrifice, resistance and loyalty. In one such eulogy released in March 2026, Sotoudeh describes Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei as Iran’s new “flag bearer”, invoking the memory of Abbas ibn Ali, Hussain’s brother, who served as the standard bearer at Karbala. What the Iran-Iraq war taught today’s Iranian leaders - and why that matters Read More » These motifs mirror recent statements by Iranian leaders. In a statement made on 17 February, two weeks before his death, then Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that just as Hussain refused to pledge allegiance to Yazid, Iran would never “pledge allegiance to the corrupt people...who are today in power in America”. Public reactions during both this war and the June 2025 Iran-Israel war suggest that many Iranians oppose foreign intervention in Iran’s internal affairs. Near-nightly pro-government rallies, where eulogists often perform, appear to draw between hundreds and thousands of attendees, according to videos published online. But opposition to foreign intervention does not necessarily translate into support for the state’s Karbala framing. Several Iranian citizens who spoke to Middle East Eye expressed scepticism towards the regime’s use of Karbala narratives in politics and foreign affairs. An Iran-based journalist alleged that some attendees at pro-government rallies in poorer neighbourhoods had been financially incentivised to attend. Middle East Eye could not independently verify the claim. The limits of state control over Ashura symbolism are not new. During the Green Movement in 2009, demonstrators led chants comparing Ali Khamenei to Yazid. More recently, mourners and maddahs who gathered in cities across Iran during Ashura in 2023 chanted anti-government slogans, invoking the same Karbala motifs. These examples show that Ashura can still provide political legitimacy, but not only for the state. State-linked Ashura narratives may mobilise some support in wartime, but their longer-term force depends on whether they are matched by broader social and political reform. An ‘Iranian’ Karbala Since the Iran-Israel war in June 2025, state-linked religious reciters have increasingly brought Persian nationalist symbols into their eulogies. During an Ashura commemoration soon after the war, Ali Khamenei asked the prominent maddah Mahmoud Karimi to perform a new version of the patriotic anthem Ey Iran. Karimi changed several verses to include religious themes, recasting Iran itself as the “land of Karbala”. What is Ashura? How do Shia and Sunni Muslims observe it? Read More » The result was not simply patriotic music placed beside religious mourning, but an attempt to fold Iran’s national memory into the ritual language of Karbala. A live recitation by the maddah Hossein Taheri during Muharram last year also drew on imagery from the Shahnameh - a poem by Ferdowsi about ancient Persian heroes and myths - blending Shia mourning with Persian epic references. In the eulogy, Taheri declared that “Hussain is not alone” in his fight, because those gathered are from the “lineage of Rostam”, a legendary hero in the 10th-century Persian epic. Critics, however, argue that Tehran is using older Persian symbols to shore up political legitimacy. The criticism also comes amid the use of similar symbols in anti-government protests in January, following a sharp decline in the value of the Iranian rial in December 2025. Some videos from the demonstrations show Iranians chanting slogans such as “Khamenei, Zahhak, we will bury you underground”, comparing Khamenei to a mythical tyrant in the Shahnameh. Karbala's social depth Iran has long tried to present the country's national identity and its religious mission as inseparable. During the Iran-Iraq War, Khamenei stated: “You cannot defend Iran without fighting for Islam, and you cannot protect the borders of Islam without raising the flag of Iran.” (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); The raising of Iranian flags by some mourners during last year’s Ashura ceremonies suggests this idea still resonates beyond official speeches. Official figures indicate that tens of thousands of privately hosted mourning ceremonies were held during Ashura commemorations last year, showing how deeply these rituals remain rooted in Iranian society. That social depth helps explain why Karbala remains useful to the Islamic Republic in moments of war and crisis. But wartime mobilisation is not the same as lasting legitimacy. The state can draw on Ashura, adapt it, and even fuse it with national symbols, but it cannot determine how those narratives are received. Their resonance depends not only on the stories Tehran tells, but on the political conditions in which Iranians hear them. Without broader reform, symbolic adaptation can only go so far. War on Iran News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0
In darkened halls across Iran, hundreds of men dressed in black beat their chests in unison as religious eulogists chant rhythmic laments of martyrdom, sacrifice and war.The performances, often lit in red and shared widely on YouTube and social media in Iran, have become a recurring feature of the country's wartime atmosphere since the 12-day Iran-Israel war in June 2025.Known as latmiyah, these mourning recitations are rooted in Ashura rituals commemorating the martyrdom of Shia Imam Hussain ibn Ali, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, at the Battle of Karbala in 680 CE.Since , prominent state-backed eulogists such as Mahdi Rasouli, Hossein Taheri, Seyed Reza Narimani and Hossein Sotoudeh have released new wartime recitations framing the US-Israel war on Iran through the symbolic language of Karbala.Some clips have drawn admiration from pro-government supporters online, while critics have condemned them as an attempt by the Islamic Republic to fuse religious mourning with political mobilisation.Increasingly, these performances have also incorporated Persian nationalist motifs, presenting the conflict not only as a defence of Islam, but of Iran itself.That raises a broader question: what narratives now underpin Iran’s wartime ritual language, and who has the authority to define the symbols of Karbala, nationhood and resistance?Millions of Iranians and Shia Muslims across the region mark Ashura each year through mourning rituals, poetry recitations and pilgrimage to Karbala, a city in central Iraq.In Shia memory, Hussain’s killing at Karbala after his refusal to pledge allegiance to the Caliph Yazid ibn Muawiyah became a defining story of resistance to unjust rule.This story of resistance later became deeply embedded in Iranian social life.After the Safavid dynasty made Twelver Shia Islam Iran’s official religion in the 16th century, Ashura rituals became a central part of religious and communal life. The result was a ritual infrastructure that outlasted dynasties and political systems and has, at various points, shaped Iranian politics.During the Tobacco Protest of 1891-92, a nationwide movement against a foreign tobacco concession, preachers spread the anti-tobacco fatwa of Mirza Hasan Shirazi, a leading Shia cleric, through mosques and bazaars. Participants in the 1905-11 Constitutional Revolution also drew heavily on Ashura symbolism in their demonstrations and political rhetoric.Decades later, the protests that deposed Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1979 featured chants such as “Our movement is Hussaini, our leader is Khomeini”, drawing a direct parallel between revolutionary struggle and Hussain’s martyrdom.Across these moments, mourning rituals did more than preserve religious memory. They also created emotional and political authority through preachers, reciters and religious singers.The establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979 amplified this role. During the Iran-Iraq War that followed, Karbala became a central language of wartime mobilisation, helping lay the groundwork for the later prominence of turning religious singers, or maddahs, as intermediaries between the state and society.This ritual infrastructure remains central to the Islamic Republic’s wartime mobilisation. Since June 2025, state-backed maddahs have framed both the Iran-Israel war and the current US-Israel war on Iran as extensions of Karbala, using mourning recitations to cast the conflicts as tests of sacrifice, resistance and loyalty.In one such eulogy released in March 2026, Sotoudeh describes Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei as Iran’s new “flag bearer”, invoking the memory of Abbas ibn Ali, Hussain’s brother, who served as the standard bearer at Karbala.These motifs mirror recent statements by Iranian leaders. In a statement made on 17 February, two weeks before his death, then Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that just as Hussain refused to pledge allegiance to Yazid, Iran would never “pledge allegiance to the corrupt people...who are today in power in America”.Public reactions during both this war and the June 2025 Iran-Israel war suggest that many Iranians oppose foreign intervention in Iran’s internal affairs. Near-nightly pro-government rallies, where eulogists often perform, appear to draw between hundreds and thousands of attendees, according to videos published online.But opposition to foreign intervention does not necessarily translate into support for the state’s Karbala framing.Several Iranian citizens who spoke to Middle East Eye expressed scepticism towards the regime’s use of Karbala narratives in politics and foreign affairs. An Iran-based journalist alleged that some attendees at pro-government rallies in poorer neighbourhoods had been financially incentivised to attend. Middle East Eye could not independently verify the claim.The limits of state control over Ashura symbolism are not new. During the Green Movement in 2009, demonstrators led chants comparing Ali Khamenei to Yazid.More recently, mourners and maddahs who gathered in cities across Iran during Ashura in 2023 chanted anti-government slogans, invoking the same Karbala motifs. These examples show that Ashura can still provide political legitimacy, but not only for the state. State-linked Ashura narratives may mobilise some support in wartime, but their longer-term force depends on whether they are matched by broader social and political reform.Since the Iran-Israel war in June 2025, state-linked religious reciters have increasingly brought Persian nationalist symbols into their eulogies.During an Ashura commemoration soon after the war, Ali Khamenei asked the prominent maddah Mahmoud Karimi to perform a new version of the patriotic anthem Ey Iran. Karimi changed several verses to include religious themes, recasting Iran itself as the “land of Karbala”.The result was not simply patriotic music placed beside religious mourning, but an attempt to fold Iran’s national memory into the ritual language of Karbala.A live recitation by the maddah Hossein Taheri during Muharram last year also drew on imagery from the Shahnameh - a poem by Ferdowsi about ancient Persian heroes and myths - blending Shia mourning with Persian epic references.In the eulogy, Taheri declared that “Hussain is not alone” in his fight, because those gathered are from the “lineage of Rostam”, a legendary hero in the 10th-century Persian epic.Critics, however, argue that Tehran is using older Persian symbols to shore up political legitimacy.The criticism also comes amid the use of similar symbols in anti-government protests in January, following a sharp decline in the value of the Iranian rial in December 2025. Some videos from the demonstrations show Iranians chanting slogans such as “Khamenei, Zahhak, we will bury you underground”, comparing Khamenei to a mythical tyrant in the Shahnameh.Iran has long tried to present the country's national identity and its religious mission as inseparable. During the Iran-Iraq War, Khamenei stated: “You cannot defend Iran without fighting for Islam, and you cannot protect the borders of Islam without raising the flag of Iran.”The raising of Iranian flags by some mourners during last year’s Ashura ceremonies suggests this idea still resonates beyond official speeches.Official figures indicate that tens of thousands of privately hosted mourning ceremonies were held during Ashura commemorations last year, showing how deeply these rituals remain rooted in Iranian society.That social depth helps explain why Karbala remains useful to the Islamic Republic in moments of war and crisis.But wartime mobilisation is not the same as lasting legitimacy. The state can draw on Ashura, adapt it, and even fuse it with national symbols, but it cannot determine how those narratives are received. Their resonance depends not only on the stories Tehran tells, but on the political conditions in which Iranians hear them.Without broader reform, symbolic adaptation can only go so far.