Rebuilding Syria’s northeast: Damascus’ toughest test yet

Rebuilding Syria’s northeast: Damascus’ toughest test yet Danny Makki on Wed, 03/18/2026 - 14:54 After 15 years of Kurdish self-rule, control shifts to government, with security, integration, economic challenges ahead Since the beginning of the year, the Syrian government has reclaimed major oil fields, factories and power plants from the SDF in northeast Syria (Danny Makki/MEE) Off A few weeks can be a long time in Syria, and nowhere has that been clearer than in the country’s turbulent northeast. More than a year after Bashar al-Assad fled and his brutal government collapsed, Syria’s northeast has entered a delicate new phase in which the old security order evaporated, essentially overnight, to be replaced by new state control, fragile understandings, and competing visions of what the post-Assad governance system should look like. Damascus has moved further and faster than many expected in reasserting itself across territory once held by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), after a sweeping military push backed by tribal fighters forced a dramatic retreat. The real test for Damascus, however, is only beginning. The deal that changed the map A central question is whether reclaimed control can translate into real gains for the war-weary, impoverished northeast – through security, essential services, job creation, and inclusive governance capable of holding together one of the country’s most diverse and unpredictable regions. What has unfolded in Syria’s northeast is far more than a shift in front lines. (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); Months of tit-for-tat fighting in the Kurdish neighbourhood of Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo culminated in an offensive that drove the SDF from Syria's second city and triggered a wider retreat across surrounding areas, including Deir Hafer in the eastern countryside. Inside Syria’s largest oilfield after the battle for control Read More » SDF control then collapsed quickly, as closely aligned Arab tribal forces sympathetic to Damascus rose up in Raqqa, Aleppo and Hasakeh to challenge its rule. Against that backdrop, a 30 January agreement between the government and the SDF became the first serious framework for ending the standoff, combining a permanent ceasefire with a phased plan to fold the northeast’s military and civilian institutions back into the state. The subsequent deployment of government forces into Kurdish-held cities, including Qamishli, was the clearest sign yet that Damascus was no longer negotiating from a position of weakness. The move, supported by the US, the SDF’s main backer, underscored that the Syrian Democratic Forces, as an autonomous project, could no longer survive independently. Abu Qasem, a senior security official, said he recently entered the northeast with government deployments and was struck by how fast the situation unravelled. “There was sustained and continuous coordination between Damascus and the tribal elements; everyone thought the SDF was never going to cede control,” he told MEE in an exclusive interview. “But as soon as the US showed that it didn’t want to be seen as too close to the SDF, the situation on the ground crumbled quickly. "Fifteen years of self-rule ended in a fortnight.” Reintegration through decentralisation? The government of Ahmed al-Sharaa has nonetheless tried to show that reintegration means more than flags and convoys. On 16 January, the Syrian president issued a decree recognising Kurdish identity and language rights, restoring citizenship to Kurds stripped of nationality, and declaring Nowruz a national holiday. It was Syria's first formal recognition of Kurdish national rights since its independence in 1946. (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); Just under a month later, Hasakah governor Nour al-Din Ahmad announced a series of practical measures, including reopening roads into the province, dispatching a technical delegation from Damascus to reactivate Qamishli airport, reinstating dismissed employees, resuming land transport links with the capital, and releasing detainees. Around the same time, the government issued a decree to expand governors’ administrative and spending powers as part of what officials described as a push towards faster, more decentralised local administration. 'Fifteen years of Kurdish self-rule ended in a fortnight' - Abu Qasem, senior security official The decision also devolves certain personnel powers to the heads of provincial capital councils, pushing decision-making down another level. The announcement read: “The Syrian Ministry of Local Governance is granting significant authorities to governors, including the hiring and firing of employees, approving investments and deals. The decision is an outcome of negotiations with the SDF, which asked for greater decentralisation.” Abu Qasem described the process not as a dramatic breakthrough but as a result of heavy daily liaison work to stabilise the northeast. The security official said that since the Hasakeh agreement, the SDF and the Syrian government have been closely cooperating on the ground. “Every day we are sending military forces to control these areas to plan out the agreed points to establish control of the state,” he said. “The interior ministry is present in all of the northeastern areas in tandem with the Kurds.” Kurdish actors want guarantees that “integration” will not erase the local arrangements, representation, and civil rights they built over years of war and de facto self-rule. Syrian Kurdish parties welcomed the rights decree, but they also made clear that cultural recognition is not the same thing as constitutional protection or meaningful power-sharing. Essentially, the Kurdish question has not been resolved by the deal; it has only moved into a different arena. Syrian Kurds carry the flame to mark the Nowruz holiday, in the village of Tel Mozan in the countryside of Qamishli, northeastern Syria, on 18 March 2026. (AFP/Delil Soulieman) (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); Aymenn Tamimi, the Syria analyst at the Middle East Forum, believes the basic balance of power is already settled. “I think the SDF will be integrated, but ultimately on the Syrian government’s terms,” he told Middle East Eye. “The objective is clear: to build a centralised state that does not tolerate autonomous or rival political projects, and that includes the SDF. “There may be some time needed to work out the mechanics of integration, but I do think it will happen. At this stage, the SDF as an autonomous project is more or less finished.” If that proves to be right, the danger is that integration will come to look like absorption without settlement. In the northeast, resentment of that kind does not stay theoretical for long. It can turn into obstruction, mistrust, local sabotage, and a form of slow-burning instability that scares off investment, weakens the state, and gives extremist forces space to regroup. IS quick to seize on security vacuum Nothing captures that risk more clearly than the prison file. In January, Syrian forces took control of several facilities, including al-Aqtan prison in Raqqa province, where 126 minors were later released. Videos circulating online showed crowds welcoming the released children, all under 18, some apparently still of primary school age. In other footage, several said they had been abused and tortured in SDF custody. Around the same time, chaos accompanied the SDF’s withdrawal from al-Hol camp in Hasakah province, where thousands of Islamic State-linked families were housed, with testimonies gathered by Middle East Eye suggesting detainees escaped during the handover. Another threat has been building in parallel: the Islamic State (IS) has sought to exploit the disorder left by the transition. The chaotic emptying of camps and detention sites, including the mass flight of families from al-Hol and fears that some detainees escaped during prison handovers, has deepened concern about a security vacuum just as IS has stepped up attacks and declared a “new phase” against Syria’s new authorities. IS has branded the government apostate and cast Sharaa as a chief enemy. Posters of fallen Kurdish fighters can be see in an abandoned SDF compound in Raqqa, northeast Syria (Danny Makki/MEE)| Meanwhile, as the US was busy evacuating al-Hol camp, US Central Command said on 13 February that it had completed a 23-day operation transferring more than 5,700 adult male IS detainees from Syria to Iraq. Separate reporting suggested that the al-Hol annex, which held 6,200 foreign nationals linked to IS, was by then almost empty. That fragility of the situation was laid bare at al-Hol, where a tense calm followed days of absolute chaos. After the SDF withdrew without warning, the camp was left unguarded for several hours, allowing detainees to rush the perimeter and escape before government forces arrived to impose control. Tamimi said the threat is not limited to jailbreaks. “IS prisoners are an issue, and some have undoubtedly escaped,” he said. “Some militias won’t see all detainees as IS; they’ll see fellow tribesmen falsely accused.” The danger, he argued, is that the same local channels that facilitate informal releases can also free committed militants. “That’s a problem for the government because some of those who escaped may actually be IS,” he said. “For IS ideologues, the Syrian government is an apostate entity – no better than the SDF.” Syria's hardest test The northeast is also too economically important to be treated as a security issue alone. The region holds Syria’s most consequential oil and gas resources, grain-producing land, and key cross-border routes. Syrian economist Yazan Enayeh said the economic upside is real – but not automatic. 'The areas that the SDF were controlling were very undeveloped. Where did all of the oil money go?' - Abu Qasem, senior security official “Syria’s reassertion of control over northeast oil and gas fields is a game changer,” he told Middle East Eye. “Expect fiscal revenues to surge from stabilised output, supporting budgets and slashing import costs. Foreign exchange flows strengthen, steadying the lira, while energy costs drop as local supply floods the market, powering growth over the next few years toward real economic momentum.” But Enayeh attached conditions that go beyond pipelines. In his view, energy self-sufficiency requires a basic investment and legal framework that Syria still does not have. “This development absolutely moves Syria toward energy self-sufficiency,” he said. “Northeast assets fill critical gaps, and with targeted investments in field upgrades, pipeline fixes, and modern refining, plus a crisp hydrocarbons law and Gulf-backed PPPs [public-private partnerships], we’ll see reliable power, fuel abundance, and export cash flows transforming the energy landscape for good.” Sharing the wealth in the northeast is crucial, as the SDF did not invest its oil money into development and infrastructure. Abu Qasem said what struck him most in former SDF-run areas was not the symbolism of state return, but the lack of development. “The areas that the SDF were controlling were very undeveloped,” he said. “Where did all of the oil money go? It clearly wasn’t on infrastructure at all. The areas we went to, we felt that we were living in the year 2000.” The northeast remains the hardest test of Syria’s post-Assad transition. Tribal networks and Arab-majority communities helped accelerate the SDF’s retreat, but they can just as easily turn exclusion into renewed conflict. Damascus may have won territory; whether it can hold it peacefully depends on delivering order, inclusion, and visible economic benefit. Syria after Assad Damascus News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0