Suez was the death knell for the British empire. Hormuz may do the same for the US

Suez was the death knell for the British empire. Hormuz may do the same for the US Sami Al-Arian on Fri, 03/27/2026 - 14:13 As confrontation with Iran escalates, Washington risks repeating the 1956 Suez crisis, which hastened the end of sterling as a global reserve currency and forced imperial retreat Cargo ships in the Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz, through which much of the world’s energy supplies pass, amid escalating confrontation between Iran and the United States, on 11 March 2026 (Reuters) Off Empires decline when their military reach outpaces their political strategy, when their economic foundations weaken, and when the people they seek to dominate endure long enough to outlast their overwhelming force. The nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956 marked such a turning point for the British Empire. The crisis exposed Britain's financial vulnerability, as US pressure triggered a run on sterling that hastened its decline as a global reserve currency and forced imperial retreat. Seventy years later, the escalating confrontation centred on the Strait of Hormuz may signal a comparable moment for American power in the Middle East. The parallels are not merely superficial or rhetorical. In both cases, an entrenched imperial order confronted a determined regional actor unwilling to submit. (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); The imperial centre relied on military force to preserve its position, yet the outcome was shaped not only by battlefield dynamics but also by deeper economic constraints and a shifting global balance of power. Suez 1956 When Egypt's president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalised the Suez Canal in July 1956, he did more than assert Egyptian sovereignty. He challenged the foundations of British imperial power in the Middle East. More than a commercial route, the canal was a strategic artery linking Britain to its remaining colonial possessions and a symbol of imperial prestige. Britain, already weakened by the Second World War, coordinated an invasion of Egypt alongside France and Israel. The crisis marked the definitive end of Britain as the dominant external power in the Middle East The tripartite aggression sought to reverse nationalisation, topple Nasser, and reassert imperial control. Militarily, the operation achieved initial success. Anglo-French forces advanced rapidly, and Israeli forces seized Sinai. Yet these gains failed to translate into political victory. The decisive factor was not Egyptian military and popular resistance alone, though they played a role. It was the intervention of the United States and the Soviet Union, the two powers anchoring a bipolar world order. US President Dwight D Eisenhower recognised both the risks of escalation and the opportunity to sideline Britain, issuing a clear ultimatum. Washington threatened financial retaliation, pressuring the British pound and restricting International Monetary Fund (IMF) support. At a moment when Britain was already struggling to pay for its imports and maintain the value of its currency, that pressure proved decisive. Britain was forced into a humiliating withdrawal, the invasion collapsed, and Nasser emerged politically strengthened. The crisis marked the definitive end of Britain as the dominant external power in the Middle East. In its place, the United States assumed the role of regional hegemon. London discovered that it could no longer pursue its strategic ambitions without American consent, and allies and adversaries recalibrated their view of British power accordingly. The Suez crisis demonstrates that military strength alone cannot sustain an empire. Even with a clear battlefield advantage, economic weakness and strategic overreach can still result in political defeat. Britain then, America now Both the British Empire in 1956 and the United States today possessed overwhelming military superiority over regional actors. Yet both were constrained by underlying structural weaknesses. (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); Economically, postwar Britain was burdened by debt - 27 billion pounds by 1956 (roughly $1 trillion today) - declining industrial competitiveness, and dependence on external financial support. The United States now faces comparable constraints. With national debt exceeding $39 trillion and persistent deficits, Washington's imperial ambitions are increasingly hostage to a weak economy and a gradual erosion of confidence in the dollar-based financial system. Trump has called Middle East wars 'crazy', but the US-Israel war on Iran may be the craziest yet Read More » Like Britain before it, the United States commands unmatched military reach but is stretched thin, with forces deployed across multiple theatres from Eastern Europe to the Indo-Pacific. The Middle East, once central to American strategy, is now one arena among many after decades of costly and inconclusive engagement. That diffusion of attention and resources leaves Washington with power, but without the ability to impose decisive outcomes. Politically, Britain misread the rise of nationalist movements and overestimated its ability to dictate outcomes. The United States today faces a region transformed by decades of conflict, where non-state actors, regional powers and transnational networks have eroded traditional forms of control. Just as the Suez crisis marked British decline, it also facilitated American ascendancy. Rather than being driven by an opposition to colonial aggression, Eisenhower's intervention reflected a calculated strategy to prevent European allies from acting independently and to position the United States as the arbiter and indispensable actor in the region. Washington inherited the structures of influence previously dominated by Britain, including the expansion of military bases, the consolidation of alliances and the deepening of economic interests. Over time, the United States became the central external power shaping the Middle East. It asserted its dominance through a network of military bases, weapons sales, oil concessions, the petrodollar system, and extensive political and economic ties with numerous nations in the region, especially wealthy Gulf states. The US also pressured key regional countries, including Egypt, Jordan and Morocco, into alignment through economic aid, mounting debt, intelligence cooperation and support for authoritarian regimes. In countries that once formed part of an Arab nationalist bloc, such as Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Sudan and Libya, US policy contributed to fragmentation and instability, producing weakened states that posed little challenge to American hegemony or Israeli policies. Imperial decline is rarely self-contained. It is often accompanied by the emergence of a new hegemonic framework. Yet the current moment differs in one key respect: no single power appears poised to replace the United States in the way it replaced Britain. Instead, the emerging order is fragmented and multipolar. Hormuz pivot Roughly one-fifth of global oil and natural gas supplies passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Any disruption would have immediate and far-reaching consequences for the global economy. Iran's ability to threaten passage rests on geography, military capabilities, asymmetric tactics and political resolve. Unlike Egypt in 1956, which relied largely on political leverage, Iran possesses a broader range of tools, including advanced missile and drone capabilities and the capacity to disrupt global energy flows. Increasingly, the region recognises the role of the American-Zionist axis in driving instability through its wars of choice. Iran has articulated a clear framework for the current confrontation. Its stated conditions include an end to US and Israeli aggression, acknowledgement of responsibility for the war, guarantees against future attacks, closure of American bases in the region, reparations, and the lifting of sanctions. (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); It also calls for a new framework governing the Strait of Hormuz that reflects its security and economic interests, alongside broader regional de-escalation, including an end to wars in Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen and Syria, and accountability for war crimes. What remains unaddressed is Israel's nuclear monopoly in the Middle East, particularly as its war on Gaza enters its third year. It has repeatedly crossed red lines, deploying overwhelming force to pursue its objectives, however nebulous they are, with no regard for international law or conventions. Iran does not need to achieve all of its objectives to claim strategic success. If the United States and its allies fail to force surrender, impose regime change, or decisively weaken it, then Iran's core objective - survival - has already been met. American limits The United States faces a dilemma similar to that of Britain in 1956, though within a more complex environment. Escalation carries significant risks. The prolonged closure of Hormuz or sustained disruption of energy flows would trigger global economic instability, drive up energy prices and place pressure on American allies. At the same time, de-escalation without achieving stated objectives would expose the limits of American coercive power. It would signal to regional actors that endurance can neutralise even the most powerful military force. This tension reflects the broader problem of imperial overstretch. The United States must manage commitments across multiple regions while maintaining domestic support and economic stability. Prolonged conflict in the Middle East strains all three. Any assessment of the current confrontation must distinguish between tactical and structural advantages. The American-Zionist axis holds a clear tactical military advantage, as it has airpower, naval capabilities, intelligence systems and technology. Yet these strengths do not automatically translate into political outcomes. Iran, by contrast, operates from a position of structural resilience. Its geographic depth, decentralised military doctrine and regional alliances enable it to absorb and respond to sustained pressure. More importantly, its objectives are limited and attainable. This asymmetry is decisive. The American-Zionist axis seeks to transform the Iranian state and the regional order. Iran seeks survival and deterrence. In conflicts defined by such asymmetry, the side with more modest objectives often prevails. End of an era The weakening of American dominance would create space for regional actors to assert greater autonomy. It would also accelerate the involvement of external powers such as China and Russia, though not necessarily in a hegemonic capacity. At the regional level, Iran's survival and strengthened position, alongside the persistence of the axis of resistance, would alter the balance of power. The assumption of uncontested Israeli military dominance would face increasing challenge. American security guarantees would be reassessed, and new alignments could emerge. In that context, the implications for Palestine are profound. The US-Israeli strategy against Iran is failing. Here is why Sami Al-Arian Read More » The weakening of American hegemony constrains the strategic value of Israel, whose military dominance has long depended on unconditional US support. As that support becomes more costly and contested, the structural foundations of that power begin to erode. The outcome will not be immediate collapse, but a gradual dismantling of its racist structures and the systems that uphold them. Military deterrence will weaken, political isolation will deepen, and internal contradictions will intensify. In this context, the Palestinian struggle re-emerges as the central question shaping the region's future. History shows that settler-colonial projects do not survive once their imperial backing recedes. The dismantling of the Zionist structure is no longer a question of if, but when, as that support recedes. If Suez marked the end of one empire and the rise of another, Hormuz may signal something different - not replacement, but the gradual erosion of imperial dominance itself. In that emerging landscape, the lesson of history remains constant. Empires fall not in a single decisive battle, but when they can no longer convert force into political control. In that sense, the outcome of this confrontation may already be determined. The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye. War on Iran Opinion Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:29 Update Date Override 0