The Next Global Food Crisis Has Already Begun
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Food crises do not begin with empty grocery store shelves. They begin when key agriculture inputs are limited and farmers shift their decision-making about planting for the next harvest. It is safe to say that the next global food crisis has already begun: Although global food prices have moderated from their 2022 peak, the foundation of tomorrow’s food supply is rapidly deteriorating.
One month into the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran, the Strait of Hormuz continues to be closed. Policymakers around the world have focused on the risks that this blockage poses to global energy markets; nearly 20 percent of global petroleum supply transits the corridor. But a more consequential disruption is unfolding beyond oil.
Food crises do not begin with empty grocery store shelves. They begin when key agriculture inputs are limited and farmers shift their decision-making about planting for the next harvest. It is safe to say that the next global food crisis has already begun: Although global food prices have moderated from their 2022 peak, the foundation of tomorrow’s food supply is rapidly deteriorating.
One month into the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran, the Strait of Hormuz continues to be closed. Policymakers around the world have focused on the risks that this blockage poses to global energy markets; nearly 20 percent of global petroleum supply transits the corridor. But a more consequential disruption is unfolding beyond oil.
About one-third of fertilizer that is shipped by sea travels through the same waterway. Fertilizer markets have tightened rapidly as shipments of key inputs such as ammonia, urea, and sulfur face delays, rerouting, and sharply rising insurance costs tied to maritime risk. Prices for nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers have risen by 20 percent to 40 percent in recent weeks, reflecting not only supply constraints but uncertainty in transport itself.
Energy, fertilizer, and food systems are tightly linked: Natural gas drives nitrogen fertilizer production, transport costs shape delivery, and insurance premiums amplify market uncertainty.
Farmers respond quickly to input cost and uncertainty. They reduce fertilizer application, shift to less input-intensive crops, or delay planting altogether. These decisions determine crop output. Reduced fertilizer use lowers yields. Lower yields tighten supply. Tighter supply drives food prices higher. Many major producing regions, including the United States, Brazil, and parts of Asia, are entering or preparing for key planting periods. Farmers in these areas are already considering shifts from fertilizer-intensive crops such as corn, rice, and wheat toward lower-input alternatives such as soybeans, pulses, and sorghum.
Food security depends not only on what crops are grown, but on whether farmers can access the inputs required to produce them—and whether those inputs can reliably move through global supply chains.
Modern agriculture depends on three primary nutrients: nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium. Nitrogen supports plant growth, phosphorus enables root development and energy transfer, and potassium improves plants’ resilience to stress. Among those inputs, phosphorus is indispensable. Unlike nitrogen, it cannot be synthesized. It must be mined, processed, and delivered. Without it, crop yields decline regardless of advances in seed technology or irrigation. Yet phosphorus availability depends less on reserves than on a functioning production system.
Phosphate rock must be processed using sulfur and ammonia—inputs that are directly tied to energy systems and concentrated in key regions, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Sulfur enables phosphate conversion. Ammonia anchors compound fertilizer production. Both depend on stable energy production and uninterrupted transport. For this reason, disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz do not remain confined to shipping lanes—they propagate through agricultural systems worldwide.
Beyond the war in the Middle East, environmental trends could worsen the food crisis. Lingering La Niña conditions continue to shape rainfall expectations across key producing regions, increasing uncertainty in planting decisions just as input availability tightens. In South America, La Niña typically brings drought to southern Brazil and Argentina, reducing soybean and maize yields. In East Africa, it is associated with below-average rainfall and drought. In Southeast Asia and Australia, it can increase rainfall variability and flooding risks. The 2020-2022 La Niña cycle contributed to significant crop losses in South America and exacerbated drought-driven food insecurity in the Horn of Africa, where millions required humanitarian assistance.
The dual pressures of conflict and climate do not operate independently. They compound risk. As farmers decide what—and how much—to plant, they are responding not to a single constraint, but to layered risk.
The effects of the fertilizer crisis will be global but will vary depending on countries’ crop cycles and import dependencies. Among the growing list of potentially affected nations are India and China. India depends heavily on imported fertilizer inputs and is now facing reduced domestic fertilizer production ahead of the monsoon season. Brazil, meanwhile, imports approximately 85 percent of its fertilizer to sustain agricultural production. Across sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, farmers operate with narrow margins and adjust fertilizer use quickly when costs rise.
These regions anchor global food production. Brazil accounts for more than 50 percent of global soybean exports. India is the world’s largest rice exporter. When input use declines, the consequences extend beyond national borders, tightening global supply and amplifying price volatility. The result will not simply be a commodity shock: It will be a full-blown food crisis.
Policy responses and diplomatic dialogue related to food crises remain tied to visible outcomes such as price spikes and shortages. But global food systems function as tightly coupled networks, where disruptions move through them in sequence. Constraints in energy, transport, and climate conditions shape production long before they appear in markets.
Policymakers must recognize these early signals. First, governments should treat food system inputs, particularly fertilizers and their underlying components, as strategic assets, and the corridors that move them as critical infrastructure. Second, they should diversify their agricultural input supply chains, as overreliance on concentrated production and transit routes creates vulnerability. Third, they must invest to strengthen resilience at the farm level—improving nutrient efficiency, supporting soil health, and reducing exposure to volatile input markets. Fourth and most importantly, policymakers must shift their focus from food crisis outcomes—such as agricultural production failures and the resulting food price crises—to the precursors: access to fertilizer.
While these longer-term policies will reduce the possibility of future food crises, regaining access to fertilizer today makes reopening the Strait of Hormuz a humanitarian necessity. The potential for a food crisis has not gone unnoticed by the United Nations. The body’s Food and Agriculture Organization predicts no more than a three-month window for action before “risks escalate significantly, affecting global planting decisions for 2026 and beyond.”
In response, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres appointed an envoy to lead the U.N.’s response to the conflict, including the effort to restore movement of fertilizers as well as humanitarian goods. “The prolonged closure of the Strait is choking the movement of oil, gas, and fertilizer at a critical moment in the global planting season,” Guterres said. “The Gulf countries are strong suppliers of raw materials for nitrogen fertilizers.”
A food security crisis does not begin when consumers face higher prices. Hunger crises begin when the conditions for producing food begin to erode. Today, that erosion is shaped by a war’s creation of a geopolitical choke point—and exacerbated by climate variability. By the time the effects appear in markets, it will be too late for policymakers to intervene. As Guterres so accurately stated, “We are getting close to the planting season in different parts of the world. Without fertilizers today, we might have hunger tomorrow.”
This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage. Read more here.
This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage. Read more here.
Ertharin Cousin is the CEO of Food Systems for the Future Institute. She also serves as a distinguished fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs; a Bosch Academy, Robert Weizsäcker Fellow; and as a visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Center on Food Security and Environment. In 2009, she was nominated and confirmed as the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Agencies for Food and Agriculture in Rome, where she served from 2009 to 2012. From 2012 until 2017, she led the United Nations World Food Programme as executive director. X: @Ertharin1
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