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What the Iran-Iraq war taught today’s Iranian leaders - and why that matters

Middle East Eye·🕐 1 sa önce·👁 0 görüntülenme
What the Iran-Iraq war taught today’s Iranian leaders - and why that matters
What the Iran-Iraq war taught today’s Iranian leaders - and why that matters MEE correspondent on Thu, 04/23/2026 - 09:01 Iran’s response to the US-Israeli war is rooted in the legacy of the 1980s conflict, which defined the country’s political and military structure Iranian soldiers during the Iran-Iraq war in the early 1980s, including current parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, second left, and Quds Force chief Esmail Qaani, centre On In September 1980, Saddam Hussein ordered a full-scale ground and air attack on Iran, hoping for a quick victory. He told the Iraqi people he would reach Tehran within weeks. Instead, the war lasted nearly eight years and killed more than a million people. Beyond the vast destruction, the war helped shape the Islamic Republic of Iran into the system it is today. At the time, Iran was still grappling with the turmoil of the 1979 revolution, which had toppled the Shah, a key ally of the US and Israel in the Middle East. The post-revolutionary Iranian army was falling apart, while nationalist, leftist and even moderate religious groups were competing with the ultraconservative clerics led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s first supreme leader. (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); Saddam Hussein’s invasion not only failed to bring down Khomeini’s rule, but it also ended up helping entrench it. The war allowed the new leadership to tighten its grip, eliminate opposition groups, and consolidate power and institutions. 'For a dictatorial regime, war is the best blessing because any dissenting voice can be silenced under its pretext and the foundations of totalitarianism can be strengthened' - Behrouz Farahani, Iranian opposition figure During those years, a quote attributed to Khomeini appeared on walls across Iranian cities: “War is a blessing.” It was, says Behrouz Farahani, an Iranian opposition figure based in Paris and critic of the US-Israeli war on Iran, cover for Khomeini’s ruthlessness. “For a dictatorial regime, war is the best blessing because any dissenting voice can be silenced under its pretext and the foundations of totalitarianism can be strengthened.” The Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988. A year later, Khomeini died and reconstruction began in full swing as Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s second supreme leader, grew stronger. Over time, graffiti quoting Khomeini faded, replaced by statements from Khamenei. But the lessons the ruling establishment drew from that war have shaped its response to political and military tensions ever since. Many of the figures who have dominated Iran’s political and military landscape in past decades rose through the ranks during the Iran–Iraq War. Abbas Araghchi, now Iran's foreign minister, seen on the far right during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s Among them was Qassem Soleimani, the slain commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, his successor Esmail Qaani, as well as Ali Larijani, a former senior security official assassinated by Israel on 17 March. Even those now leading negotiations with the US are part of the same generation shaped by the war. (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, served in the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq War before moving to diplomacy. And parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, one of the most influential men in Iran today, remained in the military ranks for years after the war, later exchanging his uniform for civilian office. Perhaps as these leaders and other members of the establishment entrench their rule in the face of the US-Israeli war launched on 28 February, they too will be repeating Khomeini’s mantra of war as a “blessing”. No allies, no choice One of the first lessons the Islamic Republic learnt from the Iran-Iraq war was that, in the post-revolutionary context, it had few real options on the international stage. The ideology that shaped Iran’s political system after 1979 left the new rulers with very few allies. (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); When the war began, not only did western powers back Saddam Hussein, but most Arab countries in the region, with the exception of Syria and, at times, Libya, sided against Iran. 'The establishment realised it had to be independent and rely as much as possible on its own resources' - Peyman Jafari, Iranian historian And with Iraq’s military quickly proving stronger, Iran lost parts of oil-rich Khuzestan province to the invading forces. Despite its isolation, internal chaos and struggle to secure weapons, Iran managed to push Iraqi forces back after about a year. That dynamic of steadfastness when confronted by a stronger adversary has been played out again in this latest war Maziar Behrooz, a prominent researcher of contemporary Iranian history and author of Iran at War: Interactions with the Modern World and the Struggle with Imperial Russia, says the country’s response to the US-Israeli assault reflects the lessons Iran’s leaders learnt from that conflict four decades ago. “While Iran was under attack by Iraq, they [the Iranian establishment] realised they were not going to receive any help from the outside, so they had to rely on themselves,” he explains. “The lesson from that war was missile technology, which they reverse-engineered and then improved. Today we see its result, both in Iran’s drone and missile technologies, which have inflicted substantial damage to those who have now attacked Iran.” Acting commander-in-chief of the Iranian Armed Forces Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (R) and Iranian President Ali Khamenei in 1988 (IRNA via AFP) Behrooz also highlights another lesson learnt in the Iran-Iraq war: move key operations underground. After the war ended in 1988, Iran began building missile and drone facilities deep inside the mountains and moved parts of its nuclear programme underground. This shift was one of the reasons the US and Israel have failed to stop Iranian missiles from being launched at Israel and Gulf Arab states over the past few weeks. But self-reliance was not limited to the military. It also became central to Iran’s political approach. Peyman Jafari, an Iranian historian and professor at the College of William & Mary, Virginia, says the Iran-Iraq war pushed Tehran toward independence in all fields. Before 1979, the country had been heavily dependent on western powers, especially the US, in both military and civilian sectors. That fundamentally changed during and after the Iran-Iraq war. “The establishment realised it had to be independent and rely as much as possible on its own resources,” Jafari explains. “Reliance on their own initiatives and strategising their policies within this framework became of high importance for them in the military, industry, intelligence, and all other fields.” Consolidating power The war also defined how the new ruling establishment would deal with power at home. Behrooz points to the overlap between the US embassy hostage crisis and Saddam Hussein’s invasion in 1980. The United States’ reputation among the Iranian public was low during the Islamic Revolution, due to the CIA’s involvement in the 1953 coup that removed the democratically elected prime minister and handed power back to the Shah. When dozens of US diplomats and citizens were detained in the embassy in 1979, that anti-American sentiment only grew. Soon after, Behrooz noted, Saddam Hussein invaded, “and then you have a war on your hands”. Iran and the US: When friends fall out Read More » “The regime used both issues to rally support for the cause and also to consolidate power,” he explained. This consolidation was also driven by a widespread crackdown. After 1981, the establishment moved faster to eliminate its main rivals, beginning with the key opposition group, the People's Mojahedin Organisation. Pro-Khomeini factions continued their suppression by forcing out Abolhassan Banisadr, the country’s first post-revolution president, carrying out military operations against Kurdish organisations, and dismantling leftist and nationalist groups. These moves also reshaped Iran’s post-revolutionary society. While many supported the new order, others stepped back and waited. “There was substantial popular support for the regime, but there were also substantial bystanders: people who stepped back, watched what was going on, and waited to see who would win,” Behrooz said. A similar dynamic can be seen following the US-Israeli attacks on Iran. The government used the war to stoke nationalist sentiment and somewhat repair its image with the public, which had been rocked after the brutal suppression of nationwide anti-establishment protests in January. Moreover, the war gave the ruling establishment an opportunity to tighten control. Executions of imprisoned dissidents increased, stricter laws on “espionage” and “contact with foreign media” were introduced, and arrests on these charges became more widespread. Building the system Beyond providing cover to eliminate opposition groups, the Iran-Iraq War also played a key role in shaping Iran’s system of governance. When the war ended, many senior and mid-level Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders moved into politics, the economy, culture and even sports management. According to Jafari, this shift had already begun during the conflict, but accelerated after the fighting stopped. As military operations ended, state institution-building picked up speed, while the large number of people who had spent years on the battlefield were redirected into other sectors. Jafari describes this process as driven by a form of “army brotherhood”. Ali Khamenei (R) speaking to Iranian troops on the frontline on 4 October 1981 (IRNA via AFP) “We should not forget the human aspect of that war,” he stressed. “The Iran-Iraq war was the cultivation of army brotherhood among the leadership of the Revolutionary Guard, that sense of ‘we went through the war’, which is seen among all who fought a war. But because that war lasted very long, that brotherhood was really forged in steel.” When these fighters returned from the frontlines, the strong ties they had formed became a force behind the creation of new institutions and the expansion of the state’s bureaucratic and administrative system. The effects of this deep institutionalisation have become clear in the latest war. While the US and Israel expected that targeting Iran’s political and military leadership would bring down the entire system, the outcome was the opposite. Explaining this miscalculation, Jafari said: “This is rooted in this slivery orientalist idea that these Iranians are kind of savages who cannot organise any modern state. This system is very organised, with layers of offices, a finance system, and planning for its own survival.” An unresolved problem If the Iran-Iraq war taught the Islamic Republic how to survive external threats, it did not resolve its internal tensions. Whatever the outcome of this war, some of Iran’s internal problems remain unresolved. Two mountain ranges, two deserts, two seas: Iran’s geography is its greatest weapon Read More » Public dissatisfaction with Khomeini and his followers existed even during the Iran-Iraq war. But at that time, the establishment had broader support and faced fewer limits in suppressing dissent. Today, that balance has shifted, narrowing the circle of power and increasing the distance between the state and society. Behrooz explains: “In any country, when you do not take care of your citizens, they will be unhappy with you. In democratic countries, they vote you out. In undemocratic countries, the ability to listen to the base diminishes over time, and as repression intensifies, understanding what the base demands becomes increasingly impossible.” The lesson the Islamic Republic did not learn is that repression alone cannot resolve dissatisfaction, simply because it deepens it over time. Jafari puts it more directly: “Because of the ideological, political and cultural restrictions, many citizens do not feel that they can be integrated in this system. Moreover, we have economic problems, poverty, mismanagement, and corruption, and that’s why the majority are fed up with the system.” War on Iran News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0

In September 1980, Saddam Hussein ordered a full-scale ground and air attack on Iran, hoping for a quick victory. He told the Iraqi people he would reach Tehran within weeks. Instead, the war lasted nearly eight years and killed more than a million people.Beyond the vast destruction, the war helped shape the Islamic Republic of Iran into the system it is today.At the time, Iran was still grappling with the turmoil of the 1979 revolution, which had toppled the Shah, a key ally of the US and Israel in the Middle East. The post-revolutionary Iranian army was falling apart, while nationalist, leftist and even moderate religious groups were competing with the ultraconservative clerics led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s first supreme leader.Saddam Hussein’s invasion not only failed to bring down Khomeini’s rule, but it also ended up helping entrench it. The war allowed the new leadership to tighten its grip, eliminate opposition groups, and consolidate power and institutions. 'For a dictatorial regime, war is the best blessing because any dissenting voice can be silenced under its pretext and the foundations of totalitarianism can be strengthened'- Behrouz Farahani, Iranian opposition figureDuring those years, a quote attributed to Khomeini appeared on walls across Iranian cities: “War is a blessing.”It was, says Behrouz Farahani, an Iranian opposition figure based in Paris and critic of the US-Israeli war on Iran, cover for Khomeini’s ruthlessness.“For a dictatorial regime, war is the best blessing because any dissenting voice can be silenced under its pretext and the foundations of totalitarianism can be strengthened.”The Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988. A year later, Khomeini died and reconstruction began in full swing as Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s second supreme leader, grew stronger.Over time, graffiti quoting Khomeini faded, replaced by statements from Khamenei.But the lessons the ruling establishment drew from that war have shaped its response to political and military tensions ever since.Many of the figures who have dominated Iran’s political and military landscape in past decades rose through the ranks during the Iran–Iraq War.Among them was Qassem Soleimani, the slain commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, his successor Esmail Qaani, as well as Ali Larijani, a former senior security official assassinated by Israel on 17 March.Even those now leading negotiations with the US are part of the same generation shaped by the war.Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, served in the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq War before moving to diplomacy.And parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, one of the most influential men  in Iran today, remained in the military ranks for years after the war, later exchanging his uniform for civilian office.Perhaps as these leaders and other members of the establishment entrench their rule in the face of the US-Israeli war launched on 28 February, they too will be repeating Khomeini’s mantra of war as a “blessing”.One of the first lessons the Islamic Republic learnt from the Iran-Iraq war was that, in the post-revolutionary context, it had few real options on the international stage. The ideology that shaped Iran’s political system after 1979 left the new rulers with very few allies.When the war began, not only did western powers back Saddam Hussein, but most Arab countries in the region, with the exception of Syria and, at times, Libya, sided against Iran. 'The establishment realised it had to be independent and rely as much as possible on its own resources'- Peyman Jafari, Iranian historianAnd with Iraq’s military quickly proving stronger, Iran lost parts of oil-rich Khuzestan province to the invading forces.Despite its isolation, internal chaos and struggle to secure weapons, Iran managed to push Iraqi forces back after about a year.That dynamic of steadfastness when confronted by a stronger adversary has been played out again in this latest warMaziar Behrooz, a prominent researcher of contemporary Iranian history and author of Iran at War: Interactions with the Modern World and the Struggle with Imperial Russia, says the country’s response to the US-Israeli assault reflects the lessons Iran’s leaders learnt from that conflict four decades ago.“While Iran was under attack by Iraq, they [the Iranian establishment] realised they were not going to receive any help from the outside, so they had to rely on themselves,” he explains.“The lesson from that war was missile technology, which they reverse-engineered and then improved. Today we see its result, both in Iran’s drone and missile technologies, which have inflicted substantial damage to those who have now attacked Iran.”Behrooz also highlights another lesson learnt in the Iran-Iraq war: move key operations underground.After the war ended in 1988, Iran began building missile and drone facilities deep inside the mountains and moved parts of its nuclear programme underground.This shift was one of the reasons the US and Israel have failed to stop Iranian missiles from being launched at Israel and Gulf Arab states over the past few weeks.But self-reliance was not limited to the military. It also became central to Iran’s political approach.Peyman Jafari, an Iranian historian and professor at the College of William & Mary, Virginia, says the Iran-Iraq war pushed Tehran toward independence in all fields. Before 1979, the country had been heavily dependent on western powers, especially the US, in both military and civilian sectors. That fundamentally changed during and after the Iran-Iraq war.“The establishment realised it had to be independent and rely as much as possible on its own resources,” Jafari explains.“Reliance on their own initiatives and strategising their policies within this framework became of high importance for them in the military, industry, intelligence, and all other fields.”The war also defined how the new ruling establishment would deal with power at home.Behrooz points to the overlap between the US embassy hostage crisis and Saddam Hussein’s invasion in 1980. The United States’ reputation among the Iranian public was low during the Islamic Revolution, due to the CIA’s involvement in the 1953 coup that removed the democratically elected prime minister and handed power back to the Shah.When dozens of US diplomats and citizens were detained in the embassy in 1979, that anti-American sentiment only grew.Soon after, Behrooz noted, Saddam Hussein invaded, “and then you have a war on your hands”.“The regime used both issues to rally support for the cause and also to consolidate power,” he explained.This consolidation was also driven by a widespread crackdown.After 1981, the establishment moved faster to eliminate its main rivals, beginning with the key opposition group, the People's Mojahedin Organisation. Pro-Khomeini factions continued their suppression by forcing out Abolhassan Banisadr, the country’s first post-revolution president, carrying out military operations against Kurdish organisations, and dismantling leftist and nationalist groups.These moves also reshaped Iran’s post-revolutionary society. While many supported the new order, others stepped back and waited.“There was substantial popular support for the regime, but there were also substantial bystanders: people who stepped back, watched what was going on, and waited to see who would win,” Behrooz said.A similar dynamic can be seen following the US-Israeli attacks on Iran. The government used the war to stoke nationalist sentiment and somewhat repair its image with the public, which had been rocked after the brutal suppression of nationwide anti-establishment protests in January.Moreover, the war gave the ruling establishment an opportunity to tighten control.Executions of imprisoned dissidents increased, stricter laws on “espionage” and “contact with foreign media” were introduced, and arrests on these charges became more widespread.Beyond providing cover to eliminate opposition groups, the Iran-Iraq War also played a key role in shaping Iran’s system of governance. When the war ended, many senior and mid-level Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps  (IRGC) commanders moved into politics, the economy, culture and even sports management.According to Jafari, this shift had already begun during the conflict, but accelerated after the fighting stopped. As military operations ended, state institution-building picked up speed, while the large number of people who had spent years on the battlefield were redirected into other sectors.Jafari describes this process as driven by a form of “army brotherhood”.“We should not forget the human aspect of that war,” he stressed. “The Iran-Iraq war was the cultivation of army brotherhood among the leadership of the Revolutionary Guard, that sense of ‘we went through the war’, which is seen among all who fought a war. But because that war lasted very long, that brotherhood was really forged in steel.”When these fighters returned from the frontlines, the strong ties they had formed became a force behind the creation of new institutions and the expansion of the state’s bureaucratic and administrative system.The effects of this deep institutionalisation have become clear in the latest war. While the US and Israel expected that targeting Iran’s political and military leadership would bring down the entire system, the outcome was the opposite.Explaining this miscalculation, Jafari said: “This is rooted in this slivery orientalist idea that these Iranians are kind of savages who cannot organise any modern state. This system is very organised, with layers of offices, a finance system, and planning for its own survival.”If the Iran-Iraq war taught the Islamic Republic how to survive external threats, it did not resolve its internal tensions. Whatever the outcome of this war, some of Iran’s internal problems remain unresolved.Public dissatisfaction with Khomeini and his followers existed even during the Iran-Iraq war. But at that time, the establishment had broader support and faced fewer limits in suppressing dissent. Today, that balance has shifted, narrowing the circle of power and increasing the distance between the state and society.Behrooz explains: “In any country, when you do not take care of your citizens, they will be unhappy with you. In democratic countries, they vote you out. In undemocratic countries, the ability to listen to the base diminishes over time, and as repression intensifies, understanding what the base demands becomes increasingly impossible.”The lesson the Islamic Republic did not learn is that repression alone cannot resolve dissatisfaction, simply because it deepens it over time.Jafari puts it more directly: “Because of the ideological, political and cultural restrictions, many citizens do not feel that they can be integrated in this system. Moreover, we have economic problems, poverty, mismanagement, and corruption, and that’s why the majority are fed up with the system.”

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